I. Introduction II. A Dynamic Model of Employment Transitions
In this section, we present a simple theoretical model of the dynamic employment decisions of individuals in the presence of uncertainty about health transitions and offers of health insurance.5 While this decision-making behavior is likely to be associated with other life changing choices such as marriage and fertility, these endogenous transitions are not modeled explicitly. The purpose of the model is to demonstrate that availability of health insurance through one's own employer and the ability to secure insurance through an alternate source have important dynamic consequences that affect job mobility.
A. The Decision and Information Sets
The model assumes two possible employment states upon entering period t: employed and not employed.6 Three health states exist: good, bad, and deceased. Prior to realization of his health state at the beginning of period t, an individual makes a decision about current period employment and health insurance, conditional on the characteristics of the job offer in hand.
The employment alternatives available to an individual who was previously employed are to be nonemployed, to take a new job, and to continue working in his period t -1 job, and are denoted j = 0, 1, and 2, respectively. Individuals who were previously nonemployed do not have the third employment option. Characteristics of any job may include number of hours, wages, health insurance coverage, pension coverage, and other nonwage benefits, among other things. For simplicity we differentiate jobs by the availability of employer-provided health insurance. Jointly with the employment decision, an individual may choose to be uninsured, to hold EPHI offered by his current employer, or to hold health insurance that is not tied to his current employer. Insurance alternatives are denoted i = 0, 1, and 2, respectively. An indicator function, dr(i, j ), describes the health insurance and employment decision of an individual in period t. That is, d,(i, j) = 1 if alternatives i and j are chosen in period t and d,(i, j) = 0 if alternatives i and j are not chosen in the period. Alternatives are mutually exclusive (that is, =.0 2J=od,(i, j) = 1, Vt).
State variables define the information available to an individual at the beginning of each period t. The information available to an individual upon entering period t includes: the previous health state (h,_-), accumulated job tenure (x1,), accumulated work experience (x2t), an indicator of whether EPHI is offered by one's period t -1 employer (0t), the availability of an alternate source of health insurance (At), and exogenous characteristics (Z,).
The transition from health state h in period t -1 to health state h' in period t is denoted 7h' where int + nhl + 7h2 = 1 Vh, Vt. Health insurance may influence health transitions by affecting the out-of-pocket costs of medical care which serve as inputs to the health production process. Accumulated tenure at period t measures the number of uninterrupted periods that the individual has been employed with the same employer up to period t. Work experience, on the other hand, measures all periods in an employed state. Admittedly, this model is a partial equilibrium model in which firm behavior (for example, the offer of employer-provided health insurance t0) is exogenous (but stochastic).7 Alternate sources of health insurance, A,, are exogenous and include, for example, insurance through a spouse's employer. The space of all possible states at the beginning of period t is S,, where s, = (ht,-, xt,, x2,, O,, A,, Z,) e S,. The way in which these state variables influence current decisions as well as future expectations is described below.
B. An Individual's Optimization Problem
The per-period utility associated with each alternative available in period t is given by Uh(C,, d,, Zt, ?h) = Uh(C,) + ehij where C, is consumption of a composite commodity, d, is a vector of the current choice indicators, Z, is a vector of observed exogenous characteristics, and ?, is a vector of utility shocks. Health status alters the utility received from each alternative. At the extreme, the utility of a deceased individual is assumed to be zero.
The budget constraint is given by (1) Ct = N, + Wt(xl,, X2,, h,, 0,)(1 -d,(i, 0)) -c,d,(i, 1)l(x,t = 0) -p'(l -d(0, j)) -m(h,, d(i, j)) V t, i, j
where N, is nonearned income and earnings, w,(xl,, x2,, h,, O,), depend on tenure, experience, health, and the availability of EPHI. There is a cost, c,, associated with taking a new job (for example, the loss of accumulated, nontransferable fringe benefits) and a premium, pit, associated with each health insurance alternative. Out-ofpocket medical care expenses, m,(h,, dt(i, j )), depend on health and health insurance in the current period. The characteristics of new jobs are observed by the individual (but unobserved to the econometrician) and he compares expected discounted lifetime utility associated with each employment and insurance alternative for each new job type. New jobs are differentiated by whether they offer employer-provided health insurance (O = 1) or not (O = 0).
We employ a dynamic programming formulation implied by Bellman's Principal. The Expected Present Discounted Value (EPDV) of lifetime utility consists of the current period utility of entering the period in health state h and choosing alternatives i and j, plus the discounted expected value of the optimal employment-insurance decision in period t given the probabilistic health state in period t + 1. More specifically, the EPDV of lifetime utility from choosing health insurance i and employment j in period t < T, given health status h and new job characteristics 0n, is written 7. The empirical model allows for the endogeneity of the observed offer of health insurance. Individuals can influence the observed availability of EPHI by choosing a particular employment option. An equilibrium model of job search in which firm behavior is also endogenous is presented by Dey and Flinn (2000 where p(On = 1) is the probability a new job offers health insurance. With a few simplifying assumptions one can derive implications of the model.8 We find that the availability of EPHI (whether a firm offers insurance or not) increases the value of lifetime utility and decreases the probability of leaving the current job. That is, group insurance is typically less costly than other sources of health insurance which raises current period utility, and the availability of insurance, regardless of whether it is taken, increases the future value of staying with that job because EPHI remains an option. Insurance from an alternate source increases the probability of leaving one' s current job because job offers from employers who provide insurance are stochastic, but (by assumption) coverage from a nonemployer source is not.
III. The Empirical Model
In this section we introduce two new strategies for generating unbiased estimates of job-lock. Our first strategy involves a unique feature of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth in relation to the data sources used in previous papers: the availability of information on whether EPHI is offered by the respondent's current employer, as well as whether such insurance is held by a respondent. Our second strategy improves upon the first by correctly modeling the correlation of the offer of EPHI with unobserved individual characteristics. We also allow these individual unobservables to influence employment transitions, the takeup of EPHI, and the holding of health insurance from a non-employer source.
A. Strategy 1: Controlling for the Availability of EPHI
The value functions defined in the previous section explicitly detail how past behavior, current decisions, and future expectations influence the value of utility associated with each alternative in each period. A Taylor series approximation to the explicit functions detailed above allow us to specify the value of choosing health insurance alternative i and employment alternative j in period t as V1j, = s,yj + ui, where s, 8 . Specifically, we assume that employment is preferred to non-employment and that being insured is preferred to having no insurance. Basically these assumptions imply that work provides positive returns and that individuals benefit from provision of group insurance by an employer (where p ij t zh(l1 -0'i)m, and Oij is the percent of total medical care costs for which the employee is responsible). See Blau and Gilleskie (2001a) for a more detailed discussion. is the vector of state variables previously defined.9 Recall that the state variables include an indicator of whether EPHI is offered by one's period t -1 employer (0,) and the availability of an alternate source of health insurance (A,). These variables have direct effects on current period utility but also may affect current behavior because they determine expectations of future values of random variables (for example, the employment and health insurance choice set).
Initially, we explain transitions from employment to the same job, a new job, or nonemployment, allowing both the availability of employer-provided health insurance and the coverage by such insurance to influence employment choices. However, we do not model the endogeneity of the offer or the takeup of employer-provided health insurance. Because our first strategy focuses only on the employment decision (which reflects the literature), we simplify the indicator function to reflect the employment choice only [that is, d,(j) = 1 if employment alternative j is chosen in period t and dt(j) = 0 if alternative j is not chosen in the period]. We also define It to reflect the (exogenous) decision to hold EPHI if it is available and include it in st. Thus, we denote the probability of choosing employment alternative j in period where the u's are assumed to be independently Extreme Value distributed. Estimation of this single multinomial logit equation includes no attempt to explicitly model the unobserved individual heterogeneity that likely biases the coefficients of interest on endogenous, but assumed exogenous, variables. We do, however, follow suggestions in the literature to control for "good job" characteristics and turnover propensity by including other observed job attributes and variables describing an individual's employment history. The purpose of this initial analysis is to illustrate how inclusion of the "offered EPHI" variable influences estimates of job lock.'?
In the empirical model we include variables indicating both the availability of health insurance from an employer, O,, and the holding of employer-provided health insurance, It (henceforth referred to as "offered EPHI" and "holds EPHI"). There are two ways to interpret the coefficient on the "offered EPHI" variable in the context of job-lock. Our first interpretation rests on the assumption that the offer of insurance should not hinder mobility; job-lock becomes an issue only if insurance is accepted. The offer of insurance will, however, be associated with positive job characteristics which reduce mobility. It is not the holding of health insurance that is correlated with positive job characteristics, but the offer of such insurance. The coefficient on the "offered EPHI" variable therefore indicates the magnitude of the mobility-restraining effects of the unobserved positive job characteristics associated 9. Approximation to the theoretical value functions is discussed in the review chapter by Miller (1999) . 10. We recognize that most of the literature does not distinguish between different destinations from one's current job, but, rather, models quit probabilities only. The results and discussion from binary logit models of quit decisions are available from the authors. However, the multinominal logit specification is consistent with our fuller set of jointly estimated equations described below, and is therefore the form of our main equation. It also allows for a wider range of analysis than the simple logit specification (see Section VC).
with the offer of insurance, while the coefficient on the "holds EPHI" variable provides an estimate of job-lock unbiased through correlation with positive job-characteristics. We refer to this interpretation as the correlation interpretation.
Our second interpretation of the "offered EPHI" variable suggests that the offer of EPHI has value independent of holding EPHI. As suggested by the theoretical model, the option to accept EPHI in the future may hold positive utility for an individual. Under this option-value interpretation, the marginal effect of the offer of EPHI on mobility is correctly considered a component of the full job-lock effect: the coefficients on both the offer and holding of EPHI are used in the estimate of job-lock. Each interpretation has a potential weakness. The correlation interpretation possibly misses the option value of EPHI and may thereby understate the magnitude of job-lock, whereas the option value interpretation may capture the correlation between the offer of EPHI and unobserved positive job characteristics and thereby overstate the magnitude of job-lock. The two interpretations should therefore be viewed as generating a conservative and liberal estimate of job-lock, respectively.
B. Strategy 2: Modeling of the Availability of EPHI
Regardless of the interpretation, inclusion of the "offered EPHI" variable eliminates the bias in the coefficient on the "holds EPHI" variable only if one is willing to believe that the offer of EPHI is an exogenous variable that is correlated with the latent "good job" characteristics. Although correlation is likely, exogeneity is not. Thus, we explore a second strategy that admits the endogenity of the offer of EPHI, as well as other important variables influencing mobility decisions. As mentioned above, individual specific turnover propensity which influences observed employment transitions, is captured in the literature by previous employment status and tenure. These variables, however, are endogenous. In order to avoid bias associated with the correlation between employer-provided insurance and unobserved "good job" characteristics and individual specific turnover propensity, we use the longitudinal observations on individuals from the NLSY and a discrete factor random effects procedure to model the permanent unobserved heterogeneity of these individuals which influences employment decisions over time. This strategy is detailed below.
We recognize that the error terms in the theoretical model (utility function errors, as well as errors in the insurance offer probabilities and health transition probabilities) should be decomposed into a permanent unobserved component (R) and random noise (u) and that this permanent heterogeneity may affect different outcomes differently (hence, we use the factor loadings, p, on the permanent factor, g). More specifically, an approximation to the value of choosing health insurance alternative i and employment alternative j, in period t, conditional on having been in employment state k in period t -1, is Vjk, = stljk + pijkl + uijkt. We explicitly include the previous employment state k because we intend to model transitions from employment and nonemployment in order to accurately capture observed (endogenous) employment outcomes. The unobserved permanent error captures individual characteristics that are correlated with having a "good job" and latent turnover propensity.
We assume that conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity, the joint probability of the employment and health insurance choice can be decomposed into the marginal probability of choosing employment alternative j and the probability of choosing health insurance alternative i conditional on the current employment choice. The probability of making a transition from employment state k to destination j in period t is (6) This second stategy improves our preliminary analyses by modeling the unobserved individual characteristics that affect the employment transition decision, the offer of EPHI, the holding of EPHI, and the holding of health insurance from a nonemployer source. If these latent characteristics affect current employment decisions, then they are likely to be correlated with initial tenure and employment status which summarize the individual's employment history up to the first year of our data. We further believe that marital status might be endogenous and hence, model it jointly with the other equations and separately explain transitions from employment by marital status.
We allow the equations of our empirical model to be linked by dependence on the common unobserved factor which is treated as a random effect and is integrated out of the model. We follow Mroz (1999), Mroz and Guilkey (1992) , and Heckman and Singer (1984) in approximating the distribution of the unobserved permanent heterogenity (g) by a step function. The points of support of the distribution, the factor loadings in each equation, and the probabilities associated with each point of support are estimated jointly with the other parameters. This procedure addresses the joint endogeneity of outcomes arising from common unobserved factors, but imposes no distributional assumption (such as joint normality) on the unobserved factors. As demonstrated by Mroz, this method creates little bias or efficiency loss when normality is the correct distribution and performs better than maximum likelihood estimators when the true distribution of the unobservables is not normal. In Section V, we refer to the single multinomial logit equation as our nonheterogeneity model and the set of nine jointly estimated equations as our heterogeneity model.'3 11. The models are dynamic because of the (testable) assumption that the probability of choosing employment alternative j today depends on the employment state occupied in the previous period, and because s, contains lagged endogenous variables such as whether a current employer offers EPHI and tenure. 12. The theoretical model implies that health is stochastic and suggests that transitions between health states be modeled with these transitions being a function of choices made by the individual and the unobserved heterogeneity. Unfortunately, there are only crude measures of health in the NLSY (see Section IV) and we did not see the value of complicating the empirical model further by modeling these transitions. Blau and Gilleskie (forthcoming) model the joint endogeneity of health and employment and allow for very detailed measures of health. 13. The nine equations are specified in Tables A2 and A3 . The dual strategies we employ allow us to generate a coefficient on the health insurance variable which is unbiased by the problems identified in the literature. As a result, we depart from the literature and interpret the coefficient on the "holds EPHI" variable as a measure of job-lock.14 We are able to generate an unbiased measure of job-lock without resorting to a difference in difference (DD) test. DD tests are very sensitive to the way in which they are specified and when specified correctly the range of possible analyses is often quite limited. For instance, in order to obtain a strictly correct DD specification, Kapur (1998) is forced to restrict her analysis to married, dual-earner respondents who hold health insurance. In addition, the reliance on DD tests has forced authors of previous papers to estimate the incremental effect on job-lock of various conditions such as having a pregnant spouse or holding insurance through a spouse's employer. They do not provide a general estimate of joblock. Our estimation strategy allows us to avoid the sample selection issues inherent in DD tests and to produce measures of job-lock that are applicable to a broad segment of the labor market without fear that our broad inclusion has biased our results. Because we recognize different interpretations of the "offered EPHI" variable, we provide several measures of job-lock to reflect these interpretations. Based on estimated coefficients, we can construct predicted probabilities of employment outcomes. The matrix in Figure 1 depicts the probabilities that can be predicted conditional on whether or not an individual was offered EPHI and whether or not such EPHI was accepted.
Note that it does not make sense for an individual to hold EPHI if it was not offered. The correlation interpretation measure of job-lock is constructed as the percent difference in turnover probability between those who were offered EPHI and accepted it (element A) versus those who were offered and declined EPHI (element B). Both groups were offered EPHI and, as a result, this measure of job-lock does not contain the effect of the offer of insurance. The difference between the elements A and B measures only the effect of holding EPHI. This measure presumes that the "offered EPHI" variable serves only to measure positive job characteristics. The Table 1 
1, denotes whether EPHI is held in t -1.
A, denotes whether insurance from a non-employer source is held in t -1. a. This measure is calculated for Specifications 1 and 4 only (in Section V); these specifications do not include the "offer option value interpretation measure of job-lock is constructed as the percent difference in mobility between those who were offered and accepted EPHI (element A) and those who were not offered EPHI (element C). This measure contains the full effect of holding insurance-the value of actually being insured as well as the option value. Including the effect of the "offered EPHI" variable in this measure allows for the offer itself to have value, but also reflects the offer variable's correlation with positive job characteristics. Finally, we construct a job-lock measure which we view as an average, or compromise, between the correlation and option value measures. The average measure is constructed as the percent difference in mobility between those who were offered and accepted EPHI (element A) and those who do not hold EPHI (element D) regardless of whether it was offered or not. We also calculate the pure effect of the "offered EPHI" variable on mobility. Under the correlation interpretation, this pure effect calculation serves as an estimate of the extent to which the "holds EPHI" coefficient would be biased, in the absence of the "offered EPHI" variable, through correlation with positive job characteristics. Although the existing literature universally assumes that this correlation exists, we are able to quantify it. The effect is calculated as the percent difference between elements B and C. 
IV. Description of Data
We estimate our model using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The NLSY is a nationally representative sample of 12,686 young men and women interviewed on a yearly basis since 1979. Detailed health insurance questions are first available in 1989 and, hence, our sample covers 1989-93. We restrict our analysis to males who are not in school, in the armed forces, or self-employed.'6 We are forced to drop a small number of observations for missing tenure and for an observed health insurance status that does not agree with employment status, marital status, or health insurance availability at the current job. Finally, because our empirical model is dynamic and we model the accumulation of state variables over time, we retain only respondents for whom a continuous panel of observations can be constructed.'7 We are left with 4,422 individuals who contribute 15. Of the three measures of job-lock constructed, the correlation interpretation measure is our clear preference for two reasons. First, it avoids the issue of correlation with unobserved positive job characteristics. Second, estimation of our model strongly suggests that the offer of EPHI has importance only through its correlation with positive job characteristics and does not hold significant option value for the individuals in our sample. Unless explicitly stated, all future references to the estimate of job-lock refer to our preferred correlation interpretation estimate.
16. The sample used in estimation includes the oversample of civilian Hispanics, blacks, and economically disadvantaged white youth that are not eliminated due to other restrictions. The respondents are age 24 to 35 over our sample period, and thus our estimates of job-lock refer to young males. In fact, quit rates among these young workers are 22 percent for married males and 36 percent for unmarried males. Quit rates from other data sources used in this literature are between 16 and 24 percent. 17. Although information on employment transitions is available every year, several important health insurance questions are not asked in 1991. Thus, we cannot measure the extent to which EPHI explains employment transitions from 1991 to 1992. The construction of all variables is performed prior to eliminating observations for the 1991-92 transition. That is, tenure, the number of jobs, and employment status for 1992 (which explain the 1992-93 transition) are determined correctly using all of the available information. We simply do not attempt to explain the 1991-92 transition. Results using an imputed value of health The main dependent variable measures an individual's employment destination in year t given his employment status in year t -1. Although weekly employment information is available in the NLSY, important variables pertaining to health insurance coverage are available only during the survey week for which the Current Population Survey (CPS) is replicated for the NLSY respondents. In order to utilize the health coverage information, we define labor market transitions in yearly increments with employment status corresponding to the week of the CPS replication. If a respondent who is employed at the time of the CPS replication has a different employer at the subsequent replication, then he is coded as having transitioned to a new employer. If he is not employed at the subsequent replication, then he is coded as having transitioned to nonemployment.'9 Table 2 The health insurance variables are a major focus of this research in terms of explaining employment transitions. They are also key endogenous (and therefore dependent) variables in the set of jointly estimated equations that allows for and estimates the unobserved heterogeneity of individuals. Table 3 presents summary statistics relevant to health insurance coverage. The summarized variables include the offer of health insurance from the current employer, the acceptance of such insurance (that is, the respondent holds EPHI), and the holding of coverage from a source other than the respondent's employer. A significant proportion of the sample who are offered EPHI decline the coverage (about 13 percent for both married and unmarried males). Married individuals are more likely to hold insurance from another source and this insurance is likely to be obtained through an employed spouse. Both married and unmarried males are less likely to leave their employer if they hold EPHI. However, the quit rate is essentially unchanged for those offered EPHI regardless of whether they accept it. Males who decline EPHI are more likely to leave their employer than those accepting EPHI. Married men tend to switch jobs rather than enter nonemployment; unmarried men transit to new jobs as well as to nonemployment.
The NLSY contains a wide range of work-related variables that are important in controlling for possible correlation between individual specific turnover propensity, employer-provided health coverage, and employment.2' The most significant employment-related variables are the vector of fringe benefits and two variables for tenure. Although their inclusion in our model follows Buchmueller and Valletta (1996) and Anderson (1998) (who also uses the NLSY), we include a more extensive vector than either of these earlier papers. The offered fringe benefits include pensions, training/educational opportunities, sick leave, life insurance, and profit sharing.22 We include a continuous tenure variable as well as a dummy for less than one year of tenure. Exploiting the panel structure of the NLSY, we further control for turnover propensity by including variables for the number of jobs ever held by the respondent interacted with age dummies.23 In the nonheterogeneity model these variables may be correlated with "good jobs" and turnover propensity, but are treated as exogenous. Our estimated set of equations, however, allows for permanent unobserved heterogeneity and these employment-related variables serve as additional controls to our explicit modeling of the unobserved individual characteristics that affect mobility.24
V. Results and Discussion
In this section we first present and discuss the estimation results from the non-heterogeneity model (a single multinomial logit equation describing transitions from employment) in order to motivate the use of the "offered EPHI" variable. We then discuss results from the heterogeneity model (the set of nine jointly estimated equations) that allows for endogeneity of several important variables that explain employment transitions. Table 4 presents results based on the estimation of our empirical model without permanent unobserved heterogeneity. It should be emphasized that these results are 21. Appendix Table Al displays summary statistics for the employment, demographic, and other variables included in the empirical models. 22. A table describing the correlation among offered fringe benefits, including the offer of employerprovided health insurance, is available from the authors. Although positively correlated, there is substantial variation in the fringe benefit packages offered by employers. 23. The number of jobs held in a lifetime is correlated with turnover propensity. However, this correlation is dependent on age. The younger the individual, the more likely that a given number of previous jobs indicates a high turnover propensity. We address this concern by interacting the number of jobs ever held with three age dummies. 24. The theory suggests that health status is an important determinant of employment and health insurance choices. Unfortunately the NLSY data contain no measures of health status. To address this we use three related variables, presence of a health limitation, body mass index (BMI), and crack use, which are biological and behavioral determinants of health, respectively. 146 The Journal of Human Resources potentially biased due to the failure to address the potential endogeneity of key explanatory variables. The results serve as an illustration of the effect of the "offered EPHI" variable while using controls for the bias associated with positive job characteristics and turnover propensity that are comparable to the rest of the job-lock literature (that is, other fringe benefits and tenure). Coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses, are presented for the "same job" and "nonemployed" outcomes; the "new job" outcome is the base case. The joint significance of the coefficients, based upon likelihood-ratio tests, is included. We calculate each (relevant) measure of job-lock (as described in Table 1 ) and quantify the effect of the offer variable when appropriate. In addition, we discuss the marginal effect of holding non-EPHI health insurance on turnover propensity.25 Following the previous literature, we begin our analysis by focusing on married men. Specification 3 of Table 4 is our preferred empirical model which includes the fringe benefits and the "offered EPHI" variable.26 We first discuss Specification 1 which is our preferred model minus the vector of fringe benefits and the "offered EPHI" variable. The coefficients on "holds EPHI" are jointly significant and imply a 31 percent reduction in mobility for those who hold employer-provided insurance. In light of our discussion above and suggestions from the literature, this estimate of job-lock is undoubtedly biased. Specification 2 adds in the "offered EPHI" variable. The offer variable is jointly significant at the one percent level. The correlation interpretation measure of job-lock is 12 percent-a substantial reduction from the job-lock measure based on Specification 1. A likelihood ratio test indicates that the coefficients on the "holds EPHI" variable are jointly significant only at the five percent level as opposed to significance at the one percent level when the "offered EPHI" variable was not included. The simulations suggest that the offer of insurance reduces mobility by 28 percent. For our sample of married men this figure represents the bias in the "holds EPHI" variable that would result in the absence of information on the offer of insurance. The differences between Specifications 1 and 2 suggest that the "offered EPHI" variable has considerable power to reduce the bias in the coefficient on employer coverage arising from correlation with positive job characteristics. Of course, this specification does not allow us to interpret the significance of the "offered EPHI" variable as capturing correlation with positive job characteristics or as the offer itself having value. Specification 3 reflects our preferred specification, which includes a vector of five fringe benefits offered by employers in addition to health insurance coverage. An important finding based on estimation of Specification 3 is the ability of the vector of fringe benefits to completely eliminate the explanatory power of the "offered 25. The predicted probabilities for the elements of the mobility matrix in Figure 1 and those reflecting the effect of the "offered EPHI" and "holds non-EPHI" variables are constructed as follows. Once we obtain parameter estimates we can predict the probability of each outcome for each individual. In the simulations, we allow individuals in our sample to retain all of their individual characteristics and recode only the variable or variables of interest for the entire sample. For example, in order to generate the transition probability for state A in the mobility matrix, we set the "offered EPHI" and "holds EPHI" variables to one. We then predict the transition probabilities for each individual and average over the full sample. 26. The complete list of estimated coefficients from our preferred specification is the same as those in the transitions from employment equations in Table A2 . Complete tables of estimation results are available upon request from the authors. EPHI" variable. The coefficient for this variable in the same job outcome approaches zero and jointly the coefficients are statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the vector of fringe benefits is significant at the one percent level. These results suggest that the offer of EPHI does not hold significant option value for the individuals in our sample. We conclude that the significance of the "offered EPHI" variable in Specifications 1 and 2 is due to the failure to properly control for "good job" characteristics. Specification 3 therefore provides support for a correlation interpretation of the "offered EPHI" variable, as opposed to an option value interpretation. We also find that the inclusion of a multitude of job specific variables, particularly fringe benefits, results in no evidence of job-lock for married men.27 The difference between Specifications 2 and 3 provides additional evidence that Buchmueller and Valletta's (1996) emphasis on the inclusion of fringe benefits in a properly specified model of job-lock is correct. An unreported specification which omits the fringe benefit variables, with the exception of pensions, suggests that, at least for our sample of relatively young individuals, the inclusion of only pensions, as in Buchmueller and Valletta (1996), may be insufficient. A more complete vector of fringe benefits is required to properly control for the bias associated with positive job characteristics.28
A. The Nonheterogeneity Model
A noteworthy feature of Specifications 1, 2, and 3 is the significance of the nonemployer provided health insurance coefficients. In Specification 3, the coefficients are jointly significant at the one percent level. Nonemployer coverage produces a positive marginal effect on mobility of 17 percent. The result suggests that individuals who hold non-employer insurance are more likely to transition than those who do not hold such coverage. Specification 4 is useful in interpreting this result; it is the preferred specification restricted to only those who were offered EPHI by their current employer.
The results from Specification 4 are similar to those from Specification 3 with regard to the nonemployer coverage variable. One could interpret the significance of this variable as reflecting that individuals who lack access to employer coverage find coverage from a non-employer source and leave their current employer in hope of obtaining employer-provided health insurance. Finding significance of the non-EPHI variable in a model estimated only on those offered EPHI (Specification 4) reveals that this interpretation may be flawed and suggests two refinements. First, it is possible that individuals who hold nonemployer coverage when they have access to employer coverage do so because they are dissatisfied with the employer coverage. They transition at a higher rate in order to obtain better employer coverage. We refer to this phenomenon as job-push, but it is important to distinguish this from Anderson's (1998) job-push. Anderson defines job-push as affecting individuals who lack 27. We run a number of unreported specifications to check the robustness of our conclusions. Specifically, we run separate specifications which exclude those who transitioned involuntarily, include coverage of spouse and children by the respondent's employer-provided insurance plan, and omit linear tenure to address the concern it may be capturing part of the job-lock effect (Buchmueller and Valletta 1996). None of these specifications changes the results or our conclusions from Table 4. 28. It should also be noted that the addition of the "offered EPHI" variable to Specification 2 (as compared to Specification 1) doubles the positive effect of holding EPHI on transitions to nonemployment. The vector of additional fringe benefits (Specification 3) alters the coefficient for this destination very little as opposed to the large reduction in the estimated coefficient on "holds EPHI" for the same job outcome. These results provide additional evidence that explanations of job mobility benefit from the knowledge of whether EPHI is offered to, as well as whether it is held by, an employee. health insurance. They exit jobs in which they do not have access to employerprovided health insurance because they do not hold insurance from another source. Our version of job-push works in an opposite manner-indeed our estimated coefficient is opposite in sign from Anderson' s.29 The second possibility is that individuals who intend to exit their current job in the near future hold other insurance so as not to experience a spell where they are uncovered. The nonemployer coverage variable acts as an indicator of a high turnover propensity. We turn to the discrete factor random effects model, which explicitly models turnover propensity, for clarification between the job-push and indicator theories.30
Specification 5 is the preferred specification estimated on the sample of unmarried men. The results are different from those for married men. Although as in Specification 3, the inclusion of fringe benefits eliminates the power of the "offered EPHI" variable, it does not eliminate the significance of the "holds EPHI" variable. The coefficients on the "holds EPHI" variable are jointly significant (at the 1 percent level) and result in an estimate of job-lock of 36 percent. Unlike married males, an alternate source of health insurance has no effect on mobility of unmarried males. Our results suggest that the situation faced by married and unmarried males is very different. There may be several reasons for this. Married males may have unobserved characteristics that make them more productive (and more likely to be married) relative to unmarried men (see Korenman and Neumark 1990 and Mroz 1999) . As a result, married men may generally find and retain better jobs which tend to offer health insurance. In addition, married men potentially have another source of health insurance in their spouses. Even if their spouses do not work or hold employerprovided coverage of their own, the potential for them to do so is always there.
In order to provide a more direct comparison to the job-lock literature, we perform a number of unreported DD tests based on Madrian's (1994) methodology. Using Specification 3, we run separate DD tests which interact the "holds EPHI" variable with "holds another source of health insurance," "holds spousal employer-provided coverage," and "number of children." We also perform two very precise DD tests by interacting "holds EPHI that covers the respondent's children" with the "number of children" and "holds EPHI that covers the respondent's spouse" with a variable denoting a pregnant spouse. The interaction term fails to obtain statistical significance in any of these runs. In addition, the inclusion of the interaction terms produces little change in the estimated coefficients on our key explanatory variables. While the row difference job-lock estimates range from 18 to -0.05 percent, the simple 29. In order to further explore the different effect of the other health insurance variable in our and Anderson's results, we run an unreported specification restricted to those who were not offered EPHI. This is the group, under Anderson's job-push theory, which would be most susceptible to job-push. Anderson's theory would predict that holding other health insurance would reduce the probability of turnover. Instead, holding other health insurance increases mobility by ten percent (although the vector of coefficients is significant only at the ten percent level). In general, Anderson produces mobility effects of between 20 and 40 percent, but attributes up to half of this job-lock as her job-push. Our different results may be due to a different methodology, analysis of different years of the NLSY sample, and inclusion of fewer fringe benefits by Anderson. 30. Specification 4 also provides verification that our preferred measure of job-lock (Job-lock 1) is unbiased through correlation between the "offered EPHI" variable and positive job characteristics. The possibility of positive job characteristic bias is greatly reduced because every individual in the sample holds a job which offers EPHI. The estimate of job-lock is very similar to that produced by Specification 3. and adjusted difference-in-difference estimates all approach zero and most have the incorrect sign. Finally, we include a DD test interacting "holds EPHI" and "holds another source of health insurance" in Specification 1 which is the most similar to Madrian's specification. Again, the DD test provides no evidence of job-lock.31
To summarize, our results suggest that young married men do not suffer from job-lock. One explanation is that as a relatively productive and, in our sample, young group, they have little difficulty obtaining health coverage at alternative employers and are therefore not job-locked. Health insurance is, however, important to them as shown by the importance of the nonemployer health coverage variable. For married men, the issue is a form of job-push or indication of turnover propensity, not job-lock. Unmarried males, on the other hand, do suffer significant levels of joblock. It is important to note that these conclusions are tentative. With the exception of the inclusion of variables for tenure, we have not controlled for latent individual specific turnover propensity, nor have we modeled the endogeneity of important explanatory variables. We turn to our heterogeneity model for a more complete examination of employment transitions and its effect on our estimates of job-lock.
B. The Heterogeneity Model
An important aim of our analysis is to account for the possibility that the holding of health insurance, as well as the offer of health insurance, is endogenous; the results from the nonheterogeneity model are likely to be biased if the endogeneity of explanatory variables is ignored. That is, something unobserved about the individual may be affecting both an endogenous variable (for example, the holding of EPHI) as well as the outcome of interest (for example, the employment transition). Such permanent unobserved heterogeneity is likely to influence observed health insurance coverage ("holds EPHI"), the offer of health insurance ("offered EPHI"), and health insurance coverage from a non-employer source ("holds non-EPHI").32 Because we have observations on individuals over time, the employment transitions themselves define endogenous tenure and the employment state in each period. An individual's employment state and tenure entering the first year of our sample, how-31. We repeated Specifications 1-5 using a logit model as opposed to a multinomial logit model. A transition was defined as a move from employment to a new employer or to nonemployment (that is, a quit). This definition follows Madrian (1994), Holtz-Eakin (1994), and Buchmueller and Valletta (1996); it appears that Kapur (1998) and Anderson (1998) also define transitions in this manner, although neither explicitly states this. The results are remarkably similar to the multinomial logit results. We also estimated logit models where a transition was defined as a move from employment to a new employer; those who transition to non-employment are dropped from the sample. The estimates of job-lock for married men are somewhat stronger than the multinomial logit estimates. However, the estimate of job-lock from Specification 3 is only 10 percent using the correlation interpretation measure and three percent using the option value interpretation measure, and these estimates are based on statistically insignificant coefficients. The results for the unmarried men are very similar to the multinomial logit results. These results are available from the authors. 32. Admittedly, holding health insurance from a nonemployer source depends on the availability of such insurance which should be treated as endogenous in a manner similar to the offer of EPHI. Unfortunately we do not have this information. We attempt to control for the availability by including an indicator of whether the spouse works in the heterogeneity model. This variable is assumed (incorrectly) to be exogenous; perhaps replacement of this variable with the spouse's age and education (the reduced form) would be more appropriate. ever, are defined by the same employment transition process that is being modeled, and are therefore likely to be influenced by the permanent unobservables.33 We jointly estimate these initial conditions with the per-period transitions from employment and from nonemployment, the per-period offer of EPHI, the per-period acceptance of EPHI if employed and offered insurance, and the per-period insurance status from an alternate source.34
A likelihood ratio test confirmed that we should allow separate equations for transitions from employment by marital status. Because marital status is endogenous and possibly affected by the same unobservables influencing employment transitions, job characteristics, and observed health insurance choices, we include an equation for marital status.35 Table 5 presents results based on joint estimation of the set of nine equations with controls for unobserved heterogeneity.36 We discuss the same health insurance and fringe benefits variables presented in Table 4 above; estimates and standard errors for all variables in each of the nine equations are presented in Appendix Tables A2  and A3 .
Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity results in different coefficient estimates for married and unmarried males compared to the nonheterogeneity model. The significance of the estimates is similar to that from the non-heterogeneity model, except that the ability of the "holds non-EPHI" variable to explain transitions for males falls. The different coefficient estimates produce differences in our predictions of job-lock. The model suggests that job-lock is nonexistent for married males even after controlling for possible correlation among unobserved characteristics influencing observed health insurance status, tenure, and employment transitions. This procedure produces smaller estimates of job-lock of between 10 and 15 percent for unmarried males (versus 28 and 36 percent in the non-heterogeneity model). The estimated impact of non-EPHI falls for both married and unmarried males. That is, married males are 12 percent more likely to leave their current job (versus 17 percent in the nonheterogeneity model) and unmarried males are 7 percent less likely to leave their job (versus four percent in the nonheterogeneity model) when they hold another source of health insurance. This reduction in the estimated effect of non-EPHI on the mobility of married males suggests that the results from the nonheterogeneity model may be correlated with a high turnover propensity-our indicator theory. Jobpush, as we define it, however, is still prevalent for married men. We can further understand the heterogeneity model by examining the predicted probabilities of each modeled outcome conditional on each discrete mass point of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. Table 6 indicates that individuals with unobserved characteristics at the right of the distribution (mass point 4) are more likely to be employed and to have more years of job tenure in 1989. In each year, they are more likely to be offered EPHI, to accept EPHI, and to have another source of health insurance. Similarly, they are more likely to remain in the same job, or to reenter employment if they become nonemployed. These individuals are also more likely to be married. This finding supports Mroz' (1999) finding in a simple example of the effect of marriage on wages: unobserved heterogeneity influences both marriage probabilities and employment outcomes.
C. Examination of Different Destinations
The multinomial logit specification of the main employment transition equations allows us to examine not only the impact of EPHI on quits but also the impact on the type of quit. That is, is EPHI'inhibiting moves to a new job or to non-employment? Table 7 summarizes the job-lock measures in Tables 4 and 5 , and also reports the percentage change in probabilities associated with movement to the specific desti- Gruber and Madrian (1994) suggests that continuation coverage (CO-BRA) serves to mitigate job-lock. That is, reductions in job mobility are smaller when COBRA health insurance is available. We agree that COBRA is likely to affect employment transitions. Our multinomial logit approach of distinguishing among employment destinations suggests that one channel through which this occurs is by encouraging job transitions that involve a spell of nonemployment. COBRA enables 154 The Journal of Human Resources individuals with EPHI to leave their employer for nonemployment without forfeiting health insurance (for a period of 18 months). In order for us to infer a positive impact of COBRA on utility-enhancing mobility, COBRA should have a positive effect on reentry to employment of nonemployed individuals. We find that health insurance from a former employer significantly (at the 10 percent level) increases the probability of moving from nonemployment to employment (see Appendix Table A2 ). The data do not indicate that this insurance is COBRA, but it is likely. COBRA allows transitions that might involve nonemployment and is a policy that is less costly, and potentially less distorting to labor demand, than requirements that employer coverage be portable.
It appears that EPHI inhibits transitions from employment to the different destinations equally among unmarried males: transitions to a new job and to nonemployment are reduced by 14.8 and 13.8 percent respectively. Interestingly, however, the nonheterogeneity model suggests that EPHI reduces mobility into nonemployment more than it reduces mobility into a new job. This finding may be related to the smaller prevalence of insurance from a nonemployer source among unmarried males. Modeling of the endogeneity of a nonemployer source appears to reduce the bias associated with correlation with unobserved characteristics that explain the lack of such a source.
VI. Conclusion
Our findings convince us that young married men who hold employer-provided health insurance are not locked into their jobs. Such health insurance, however, is likely to reduce the mobility of unmarried males by 10 to 15 percent. One explanation for the different results by marital status is the idea that something unobserved influences marital status as well as employment choices in such a way that EPHI is "too good" to risk losing. Perhaps these males believe that they would have more difficulty finding a new job that offers health insurance as is suggested by our heterogeneity model and the results in Table 6 . Our controls for unobserved heterogeneity in the estimated set of structural equations that allows the offer of EPHI, as well as accepting EPHI, having another source of insurance, tenure, and marital status, to be endogenous, produce an estimate of job-lock that is substantially smaller than the model that does not control for unobserved individual characteristics.
If insurance-induced job-lock does indeed reduce mobility, we agree with Gruber and Madrian (1994) and Holtz-Eakin (1994) that such job-lock is a short-run problem. (Our estimates from a model of annual transitions indicate that job-lock is not relevant for married males and is small for unmarried males, but analysis of shorter time intervals might produce different findings.) The requirement that EPHI be portable and void of preexisting conditions clauses, while noble, has costly implications for employers and might not be necessary to promote unrestricted mobility between jobs. Although the NLSY data do not allow us to quantify the effect of COBRA on employment transitions, Gruber and Madrian find evidence that this short-run solution has the ability to increase mobility among those who have insurance. This legislation may be sufficient to alleviate job-lock when it exists. Our results suggest that EPHI encourages transitions from employment to nonemployment among married males; this movement might be explained by the federal requirement of temporary continuation coverage. We also find evidence that insurance from a former employer (potentially temporary COBRA coverage) promotes reentry to employment.
As we demonstrate, it is important to have detailed employment characteristics describing both an individual's employment history and the fringe benefits offered by his firm. Few data sets provide this detail for a nationally representative sample. Also deficient in datasets that do offer such detail is useful information on health and medical care expenditures. The 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, which updates the 1987 NMES with design enhancements and expanded questions, contains interviews with employers and information about other health plans available to, but not chosen by, employed respondents. This information may enable researchers to identify different valuations of health insurance among individuals. This promising dataset will be useful in future studies of health insurance and its effects on job mobility. 
